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Abstract
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was introduced with the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In the vast waters extending from the baselines to 200 nautical 
miles, the Convention allows coastal States to enjoy sovereign rights over―fishing resources but 
has created delimitation issues with neighboring States. Law enforcement is vital to maintain 
fishery order for sustainable utilization of resources in EEZs, even in the contested maritime 
zones. Therefore, in this paper, the mechanism of law enforcement in the complicated contested 
maritime zone is described, taking the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement as an example of a 
possible practical solution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, 
“LOSC”) was adopted in 1982 and came into force in 1994. The Convention 
was adopted after more than 30 years of discussions and negotiations by more 
than 160 States. The Convention, inter alia, codified written and unwritten 
law and integrated four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. 
Thus, the Law of the Sea Convention is regarded as the constitution at sea.
One of the most significant features of the Convention was the introduc-
tion of 200 nautical miles (NM) of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The 
EEZ is not a part of the territorial sea and neither does it fall under the sover-
eignty of the coastal State. On the other hand, coastal States have the right to 
the natural resources of the waters, seabed, and subsoil and may utilize natural 
resources, including fishery and oil and gas resources, in the vast waters of 
their EEZs for further economic development. It is the sui generis zone and, 
thus, significant for the coastal States.
The EEZs, however, brought the coastal States not only natural resourc-
es but issues of delimitation. Due to the presence of EEZ of the opposite or 
neighboring States, States needed to delimit their EEZs to less than 200 NM. 
 The introduction of the EEZ reduced almost one-third of the tra-
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ditional high seas which was governed by the freedom of high sea. 
 Some semi-enclosed seas, such as the Baltic Sea and the East China Sea, 
mostly became a part of the EEZ of coastal States. 
 Besides, the delimitation of the EEZs is politically sensitive. Delimi-
tation of EEZ often means setting out the geographical scope of waters, in 
which natural resources are available for the coastal States. Therefore, the 
negotiation process is often challenging, particularly for those zones having 
abundant resources. This can be explained using the perfect example of the 
East China Sea. Traditionally, the East China Sea serves as fishing grounds as 
it is rich in fishery resources. In addition, the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) reported that the East China Sea 
has the potential richest seabed with oil and hydrocarbon deposits in 1969.
Regarding the delimitation, the Japanese government consid-
ers median lines from the baselines for the appropriate and equi-
table delimitation of EEZ; this is reflected in the domestic law.  
 In comparison, the Chinese law simply stipulates the Chinese EEZ as 200 
NM from its baselines and, in the case of overlapping with adjacent or oppo-
site coasts, delimitation “shall be determined under the principle of equity and 
based on the international law” without further detailed guidance. The dis-
tance between Japan and China in the East China Sea is less than 400 NM and 
different justification was claimed; hence, this raised the delimitation issue. 
If there is no agreed borderline of EEZ between two States, how can a 
State maintain legal order in the overlapping zone through law enforcement 
operations? The role of law enforcement activities is to put legal order in 
reality through, inter alia, deterring violations of applicable laws and regula-
tions by patrolling and showing its presence and suppressing and addressing 
wrongdoers. Before the introduction of the EEZ, for example, fishery activi-
ties in the East China Sea used to be governed by the freedom of high seas 
and controlled by the principle of the flag state jurisdiction. After the Law of 
the Sea Convention came into effect, the legal order in EEZs is to be governed 
by the coastal State in accordance with the legal regime of the EEZ. Without 
any clear delimitation line of the EEZ, what legal regime should be applied, 
and which coastal State may exercise jurisdiction over infringement in the 
overlapping EEZ need to be elucidated.
 This paper examines such issues that emerged with the adoption of 
the LOSC and that are persistent in the overlapping EEZ. This paper reviews 
the rights and duties of States in the EEZ, including law enforcement, and 
duties of coastal States in overlapping maritime zones under the Convention. 
Then, as a possible solution, the Japan-China fishery agreement is introduced 
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to examine its role in maintaining the legal order of fishery activities at sea. 
This Agreement has two functions, namely, (1) to provide a framework for 
sustainable fishery activities and (2) to clarify law enforcement mechanisms. 
Although it is essential to set out a sustainable standard for fishery activities, 
this paper mainly highlights the mechanisms of the maritime law enforcement 
aspect, which practically realize the standard.
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COASTAL STATE IN EEZ 
UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
A. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
The LOSC introduced a new maritime zone, the EEZ, which is up to 200 
NM from the baselines. In this zone, coastal States have so ereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conser ing and managing natural re-
sources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed 
and of the seabed and its subsoil. Besides, the coastal States have jurisdiction 
over artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research, 
and protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
As to the living resources in the EEZ, Article 61 obligates coastal State 
to conserve in the EEZ. The Coastal State needs to take conservation and 
management measures to avoid endangering living resources through over-
exploitation. Such measures include setting out the maximum sustainable 
yield based upon the best scientific research available, and cooperate in the 
region or global level, if appropriate.  For stocks occurring within the EEZs 
of two or more coastal States or both within the EEZ and in an area beyond 
and adjacent to it,  highly migratory species, marine mammals, anadromous 
stocks, and catadromous species  have their own rules for conservation and 
management. In contrast, sedentary species follow the regime of the Conti-
nental Shelf in Part XI.
When the use of EEZ overlaps with other States, “due regard” obligation 
comes into play. Article 56 provides “in exercising its rights and performing its 
duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone the coastal State 
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States.” The high seas 
rules, including freedom of navigation, also apply to the EEZ by virtue of Ar-
ticle 58(2). When a State, other than the coastal State, enjoys the rights applied 
in the high sea, the State has due regard obligation to the rights and duties of the 
coastal State and comply with laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State. 
 Typical examples of overlapping interests are the navigation of ships versus 
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laying of fishing gears and naval maneuver exercises. Therefore, “due regard” 
obligation is imposed on both coastal State and other States in the EEZ in 
order to balance the interests of these States.
Exercise jurisdiction by the coastal State in its EEZ is set out in Article 
73. This Article allows coastal States to take law enforcement measures with 
regard to the sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the 
living resources in EEZs. The domestic laws and regulations relating to fish-
ery activities of coastal States are applicable in its EEZ, and law enforcement 
activities are “necessary to ensure compliance” with such laws and regula-
tions as prescribed in the Article. In case of violation of these domestic laws, 
a coastal State may take measures including boarding, inspection, arrest, and 
judicial proceedings. If appropriate financial security or bond is posted, the 
coastal State needs to apply the bond scheme, where detained boats shall be 
released promptly. Besides, the penalty is restricted to monetary punishment 
and does not include imprisonment or any corporal punishment. In cases of 
arrest or detention, the coastal State notifies the flag State regarding measures 
taken and penalties imposed. 
B. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES IN THE DELIMITATION 
OF EEZS
Article 74 stipulates “(t)he delimitation of the exclusive economic zone be-
tween States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement.” 
When no agreement can be reached, relevant States may proceed to measures pro-
vided in Part XV, “Settlement of Disputes,” or to “enter into a provisional agree-
ment of practical nature.” During this transitional period, States concerned are 
obliged not to jeopardize or hamper the process of reaching the final agreement, 
 which often referred to as the duty to “self-restraint.” 
In this paper, a pertinent question is whether or not law enforcement activ-
ities in contested water jeopardize or hamper the process of reaching the final 
agreement. Article 74 does not provide any guidance on what activities can be 
considered as a breach of this duty. For example, if Japanese or Chinese au-
thorities exercise jurisdiction over a foreign fishery boat in overlapping zones, 
the question is whether or not it would be a breach of the duty to self-restraint.
International court cases have suggested the standard of this duty. In the 
Suriname-Guyana Award, the Arbitral Tribunal saw that, in the first place, 
the duty does not entirely preclude activities by States in the contested area. 
 On the other hand, the Tribunal found that unilateral actions that cause a 
physical change to the marine environment would jeopardize or hamper 
the process of reaching the final agreement on the delimitation of maritime 
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boundary and are, thus, not permissible. This decision was consistent with 
that of the Aegean Sea Case between Greece and Turkey. Greece requested 
the International Court of Justice to direct, inter alia, refrain from all explo-
ration activities or any scientific research on the disputed continental shelf. 
Turkey carried out a seismic research activity by a ship, including using small 
explosives to send sound waves to the seabed. The International Court of Jus-
tice denied the request since the research did not risk any physical damage to 
seabed and subsoil and natural resources therein and was of temporary nature.  
 This stance was maintained in the Arbitral Tribunal.
Next, the Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire case addressed this duty, too. Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire submitted their disputes on territorial sea and EEZ to the 
Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 
and Côte d’Ivoire requested provisional measures to suspend Ghana’s activ-
ity for natural resources. In the order of the provisional measures in 2015, the 
Special Chamber of ITLOS pointed out that unilateral activities to gain infor-
mation in the disputed area and the use of such information may cause irre-
versible risk to the other. Yet, it did not order to stop the existing activities but 
only new activities.  In the judgment of the case in 2017, the Special Chamber 
of the Tribunal avoided stipulating the standard of violation and did not find 
a breach of duty to self-restraint in Ghana’s unilateral activities.  However, 
Judge Paik, in his separate opinion, argued that activities causing a physical 
change to the marine environment is an element for consideration. He con-
tended it is a “result-oriented notion” and the necessity to consider whether 
the actions in question would endanger the process of reaching a final agree-
ment. In other words, it is the case-by-case basis to determine whether activi-
ties in question amount to jeopardizing or hampering the process of reaching 
the final agreement. 
Considering these points, law enforcement activities in the contested mar-
itime zone would be a breach of duty of self-restraint. Such activities do not 
cause a physical change to the marine environment, in general. Therefore, law 
enforcement activities do not meet the standard of a physical change to the ma-
rine environment. On the other hand, law enforcement activities clearly express 
that the contested area is under the jurisdiction of one State since law enforce-
ment is based on State jurisdiction. This claim would be provocative to the other 
party and make the negotiation process difficult. Thus, reaching the final agree-
ment could be jeopardized or hampered through law enforcement activities.  
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III. THE FUNCTION OF JAPAN-CHINA FISHERY AGREE-
MENT
Now, a pertinent question arises on how a coastal State can conduct law 
enforcement operations to maintain legal and fishery order in contested waters. 
A coastal State has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage 
living resources in the EEZ and, to ensure compliance of laws and regulations, 
the right to carry out law enforcement activities. Nevertheless, in overlapping 
maritime zones, law enforcement activities are often challenging since those 
activities could be a breach of international law and raise diplomatic tension. 
As a result, the coastal State may hesitate to take law enforcement measures 
against infringement. On the other hand, if no law enforcement activities are 
carried out, there will be no power to maintain the legal order, which would 
possibly lead to lawlessness. This paper analyzes the law enforcement mecha-
nism of the Japan-China Fishery Agreement as an example of addressing this 
legal complexity in overlapping maritime zones to maintain legal order in the 
contested area of East China Sea.
A. 1955 AGREEMENT
The Agreement originated before the adoption of the Law of the Sea Con-
vention. Around the end of the Korean Peninsula War in the 1950s, more than 
160 Japanese fishery fleets and 1,900 fishers were detained by Chinese volun-
tary corps on the high seas off the Chinese coast without clear explanations.  
 Since the Japanese government had not recognized the then Chinese Com-
munist government, the Japanese government could not take effective protest 
measures without proper diplomatic relations. A Japanese non-government 
organization, the Japan-China Fisheries Enterprise Association, initiated the 
negotiation process with the Chinese side, the China Fisheries Council. 
The first private Agreement was adopted in 1955 (hereinafter, “55 Agree-
ment”) to ensure the safety of fishery operations and avoid detentions and 
maintain freedom of high seas, including fishery. The 55 Agreement was ap-
plied to the high seas of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea and, inter alia, 
designated six fishery zones for trawling to restrict fishery activities and pro-
moted cooperation in case of accidents. Fishery councils, representing both 
States, took responsibility to supervise fishers for compliance of the Agree-
ment, and in case of breach of trawling operations, such incidents were to be 
reported to the other party, which reported back the results of the investiga-
tion. This mechanism ensured enforcement jurisdiction by the flag state. The 
Agreement was renewed, and a series of revised Agreements were adopted 
in 1963 and 1965, respectively; however, the framework of the Agreement 
was maintained until the 70s and influenced subsequent intergovernmen-
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tal Agreements. All these Agreements were provisional and private Agree-
ments, but it secured the safety of fishery operations in the East China Sea.  
B. 1975 AGREEMENT
The first formal intergovernmental agreement was concluded later in 1975 
 (hereinafter, “75 Agreement”) after the Joint Communiqué of the Govern-
ment of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China was 
signed in 1972. This 75 Agreement basically inherited the existing fishing 
order rather than providing a completely new fisheries regime. Nevertheless, 
this Agreement was significant since both governments officially recognized 
the existing fishery order, in particular, the following points.
Firstly, the 75 Agreement shelved territorial disputes in the Senkaku Is-
lands and delimitation of the continental shelf between two countries. The 
Chinese government had put forward its claim on Senkaku Islands after the 
ECAFE suggested potential oil and gas reservoirs in the East China Sea in 
1968. Therefore, the Agreement applied to the high seas of the Yellow Sea and 
the East China Sea north of the Latitude 27 degrees North and excluded off 
the Senkaku Islands and Japanese coastal areas. Article 1 of this Agreement 
stipulates, “(n)o provision of this Agreement shall be deemed to prejudice 
their respective positions on maritime jurisdiction.” 
Second, protected areas from fisheries activities were taken over in this 
Agreement. During the negotiation, the Chinese delegation claimed the suc-
cession of the unilaterally claimed security zones, namely the Military Warn-
ing Zone in the Bohai Sea, the Military Navigational Zone in the south of 
Shanghai, and Military Operation Zones in the north of Taiwan. The Japanese 
government did not recognize these zones mainly due to inconsistency with 
international norms, including the freedom of high seas. Besides, the security 
situations in the East China Sea and the Yellow sea had been substantially 
improved in the mid-70s compared with that of the 50s, and the legitimacy of 
such zones seemed illogical. On the other hand, early adoption of the Agree-
ment was essential for the safety and reasonable exploitation of fish resourc-
es. Therefore, the Japanese government reserved its stance on these military 
zones but decided pragmatically to deem these areas as protected areas for 
fishery resources and prohibited fishery operations. 
Third, regarding the enforcement mechanism, both sides agreed 
with the principle of the flag state jurisdiction. Each party instructed 
and supervised its fishery fleets to comply with the 75 Agreement faith-
fully and, in case of breach by domestic fishers, punished them. In case 
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of breach by foreign fishers, each State reported the breach to the oth-
er party, which, in turn, reported back the results of the investigation. 
 Each State was not allowed to take enforcement measures such as stopping 
and warning the breach witnessed on the scene. Thus, the law enforcement 
mechanism was retained in the flag state jurisdiction strictly in this Agree-
ment, too. 
C. CHANGES IN THE MARITIME LEGAL REGIME
 Around this time, there were changes in the international maritime or-
der, which substantially influenced the Japanese maritime policy. The interna-
tional community had gradually accepted the 200 NM maritime zones for the 
exploitation of fishery resources. The Japan government initially opposed the 
new maritime zone as it adversely affected the expanding Japanese fishery in-
dustry; however, it later changed its stance and accepted the new maritime zone. 
 In 1974, however, the Japanese delegation to the UN Conference of the Law 
of the Sea in Caracas witnessed that Japan was one of the few States to com-
mit 3 NM for territorial sea. The majority had moved and accepted 12 NM 
for territorial seas and 200 NM for EEZs, which was reflected in the Informal 
Single Negotiation Text. Reflecting this movement, the neighboring States, 
including the US, Canada, and the USSR, introduced their fishery zones up 
to 200 NM from the baselines. Observing the acceptance of the new maritime 
zone by the international community and movement of neighboring States, the 
Japanese government decided to change its stance.
Finally, the Japanese government adopted a new legislation to reflect the 
new policy. The government adopted the Act on Temporary Measures Con-
cerning Fishery Waters  to counter the introduction of 200 NM zones by 
neighboring States. This Act set out the Japanese 200 NM fishery zones ex-
cept for the west part of the Sea of Japan (west of 135 degrees East), the East 
China Sea, and a part of the Pacific Ocean (the Southwestern parts of the Oki-
nawa Islands), considering that China and Korea had not set out such zones 
yet. When the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 became effective for Japan 
in 1996, the Japanese government adopted the Act on Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf, which abolished the Act on Temporary Measures 
Concerning Fishery Waters. This new Act set out the Japanese EEZ as 200 
NM from the baseline; in case of overlapping of EEZ claims with neighboring 
or opposite State, the delimitation of the EEZ should be based on equidistant 
lines.
Soon after, the issue of delimitation of EEZs between Japan and China in 
the East China Sea appeared. In 1998, the Chinese government adopted the 
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Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
the Continental Shelf, which provides the Chinese EEZ as 200 NM from the 
baselines. The Law, however, does not suggest a practical solution in case of 
overlapping claims with other States but simply provides that for claims that 
overlap with adjacent or opposite coasts, delimitation “shall be determined 
under the principle of equity and based on the international law” without fur-
ther detailed guidance. Besides, the Chinese side claims its continental shelf 
up to the Okinawa Trough by upholding the theory of natural prolongation and 
claims further that other characteristics of the East China Sea, such as length 
of the coastline, should be taken into account for equitable solution. This dif-
ferent approach towards the delimitation of EEZ created the overlapping area 
in the East China Sea. Despite consultation between the two States, there is no 
agreed delimitation line of the EEZ yet. Thus, a new agreement became neces-
sary for exercising sovereign rights and the jurisdiction of two States and the 
utilization of fishery resources. 
D. 1997 AGREEMENT
The governments of Japan and China concluded this new Agreement in 1997  
 (hereinafter, “97 Agreement”). This Agreement is significant since it recon-
ciles the legal regime of the LOSC, in particular, the EEZ regime, and the ex-
isting traditional fishery regime in the East China Sea by separating maritime 
zones. In other words, the 97 Agreement, as a practical solution, allows both 
States to utilize fish resources sustainably in the overlapping EEZs.
The 97 Agreement sets out the geographical scope of its application to the 
entire EEZ of both States.  As in the previous Agreement, this new Agreement 
shelves the delimitation issue by providing that “nothing in this Agreement 
shall be deemed to prejudice the position of either Contracting Party regarding 
any question on the law of the sea” (Article 12). Besides, the fishery protected 
zones that remained in the previous Agreement were abolished since these 
areas are now in the Chinese EEZ, and fisheries activities are under the sov-
ereign rights of China.
In order to overcome overlapping maritime claims in the East China Sea, 
the 97 Agreement introduced unique maritime zones. First, this Agreement 
designates the “Provisional Measures Zone” in the East China Sea, where the 
EEZ claims overlap (Article 7(1)). Also, the Agreement excludes waters in the 
south of the Latitude 27 degrees North (Article 7(2)), where Senkaku Islands 
rests. Furthermore, the north of the Provisional Measures Zone is designated 
as an intermediate zone, where the traditional fishing pattern is maintained. 
This zone is located at the south tip of the EEZ claimed by Korea and was 
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introduced by the exchange letter between the relevant Ministers. In order to 
accelerate entry into force of this Agreement, both governments agreed to al-
low their fishery fleets to carry out fishery operations without a fishery license 
issued by the other party. This zone is not prescribed in the Agreement, but, in 
reality, the fishery regime is identical to the waters in the south of the Latitude 
27 degrees North, which is excluded from the Agreement. In short, from the 
perspective of the fishery regime, the Agreement designated waters where the 
EEZ claim is overlapping, such as the Provisional Measures Zone. (Fig.1)
In the Provisional Measures Zone, the flag State jurisdiction, the tradi-
tional legal regime before the LOSC, is retained. In this zone, both States 
observe the decision made by the Japan-China Fisheries Joint Committee 
and take appropriate conservation measures and quantity control measures 
so as not to endanger living resources by overexploitation while considering 
the influences of the traditional fisheries. (Article 7(2)) In case of taking law 
enforcement measures, each State exercise jurisdiction over its fishery fleets 
only. Therefore, for example, the Japanese authorities exercise jurisdiction 
over Japanese fishery fleets only in this zone. 1 When a Japanese patrol ship 
witnesses a violation by a Chinese boat, the Japanese patrol ship may warn the 
Chinese fishery boat on the scene but does not take any further action. Instead, 
the Chinese authority will be notified and take measures against the fishery 
boat. (Article 7(3)) This warning against breach by foreign fishery boats is one 
improvement to ensure more strict compliance of the Agreement. 
The same regime applies to the East China Sea of the south of the Latitude 
27 degrees North and the intermediate zone of the north of the Provisional 
Measures Zone. In the exchange letters between both governments, the Japa-
nese (or Chinese) government will not apply its fishery laws and regulations 
over Chinese (or Japanese) nationals in these zones provided the cooperation 
between two States is maintained not for endangering living resources in this 
zone by overexploitation. Thus, both States carry out law enforcement activi-
ties against domestic fishery boats only.
The EEZ regime of the LOSC is applied to waters not designated as the 
Provisional Measures Zone, which is the “Reciprocal Measures Zone.” Each 
State may exercise sovereign rights over fish resources in its EEZ, as stipu-
lated in the LOSC. One State allows fishing operation by the other party and 
may decide the kind of fish, quota, operating areas, and other conditions for 
the other State annually, taking into account the conditions of resources and 
capacity of its fishery fleets. 2 In setting concrete terms, the Japan-China Fish-
1  On the other hand, the agreement is not applicable within territorial seas. Therefore, any violation by a 
Chinese fishing boat in the Japanese territorial sea is subject to law enforcement by the Japanese authorities.
2  Article 3 of the 1997 Agreement
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eries Joint Committee is established to negotiate for recommendations, which 
is subject to be endorsed by both parties. In case of violation of laws and 
regulations, one State may take law enforcement measures subject to prompt 
release upon sufficient bond in accordance with Article 73 of the LOSC. The 
State needs to notify the other party regarding the measures taken and punish-
ment imposed.
IV. IMPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
One of the most pertinent functions of the fishery Agreements between Ja-
pan and China is to reconfirm and introduce fishery law enforcement mecha-
nisms in the East China Sea. The 55 and 75 Agreements confirmed that only 
the flag state could exercise jurisdiction over its boats on high seas or the 
principle of the flag state jurisdiction. The confirmation of this provision was 
essential to avoid detention of Japanese fishery fleets by the Chinese authority. 
The explanation of these detentions was not clear nor consistent with inter-
national legal and fishery order at sea. Since the number of Japanese fishery 
fleets detained by Chinese authority was significantly reduced after the adop-
tion in 1955, 3 this Agreement was successful for this purpose.
Upon the adoption and entry into force of the LOSC and the introduc-
tion of the EEZ regime, the new legal regime brought separate issues in law 
enforcement. First, the claims of EEZs of Japan and China overlap with each 
other. Both governments have not yet found any solution of delimitation. The 
coastal State has sovereign rights over natural resources, including fishery 
resources, in its EEZ. Which State’s laws and regulations to apply and enforce 
is unclear without the clear delimitation line. Second, law enforcement activi-
ties in the overlapping EEZ would be a breach of the LOSC, as argued before. 
Law enforcement activities are essential to maintain the legal order and realize 
the sustainable use of fishery resources. However, the States would hesitate 
to take such action to avoid a violation of international law. Moreover, such 
events would escalate the situation and raise diplomatic tensions, which will 
result in further difficulties in the negotiation process in the future.
To address these issues, the 97 Agreement designated and introduced the 
Reciprocal Measures Zone, where the EEZ regime applies, and other zones, 
including the Provisional Measures Zone, where flag state jurisdiction applies. 
This separation clarifies the laws and regulations applicable to fishery boats of 
each State. Within the Reciprocal Measures Zone, Japan and China, as coastal 
3  See Kataoka, “History of the Trawl Fisheries”, note 28 above, 5.
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States, may enjoy sovereign rights and exercise jurisdiction over both domes-
tic and foreign boats. On the other hand, the flag State jurisdiction is retained 
in the Provisional Measures Zone to avoid a breach of the LOSC provision 
and diplomatic confrontation. Without these mechanisms, both States would 
not have been able to carry out enforcement activities effectively, which could 
lead to lawlessness in fishery activities as well as overexploitation.
Moreover, the law enforcement function of the Japan-China Fisheries 
Joint Committee of 97 Agreement is working suitably. For example, Japan 
witnessed a swarm of 212 Chinese coral poaching boats off the Ogasawara 
Islands chain in the Pacific Ocean in 2015. 4 Due to the vastness of the ocean, 
law enforcement operation was significantly challenging since huge resources 
and efforts were required. Japan Coast Guard arrested ten boats for violation 
of Japanese fishery law and fishery activities without a license. The Japanese 
government quickly updated the penalty to ten folds and notified these cases 
to the Chinese authorities. Chinese government inspected suspected boats and 
investigated cases. As a result of the increased penalty imposed upon coral 
poaching and efforts by Chinese authorities, the number of Chinese poaching 
boats in the vicinity reduced significantly. 5 This fact demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of the law enforcement function by the Committee.
On the other hand, there still challenges in the Provisional Measures Zone. 
First, the efforts of two States to due diligence to their fishers remain an im-
portant issue. If a State is not eager to enforce laws and regulations over its 
fishery fleets, the fishery order is volatile. The other party may warn violations 
of the other but is not allowed to take enforcement measures. This structure 
may further lead to unfairness in fishery activities and destroy the fishery or-
der expected through the Agreement.6
Second, the 97 Agreement is effective only for Japan and China. For ex-
ample, the Agreement does not bind Korean and Taiwanese fishery fleets. In 
order to harmonize legal fishery regime in the northern part of the East China 
Sea with Korea and accelerate the ratification process, the intermediate zone 
was introduced. A separate, non-governmental fishery agreement was neces-
sary between Japan and Taiwan to bring the harmonized fishery order in the 
East China Sea. These separate agreements lead the fishery order and law en-
forcement operations complicated. As far as the fishery Agreement is bilateral, 
the treatment of the third party remains in the future.
4  Japan Coast Guard, Annual Report 2015.
5  Japan Coast Guard, Annual Report 2016.
6  The Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 1998, was suspended in 2016 
due to, inter alia, illegal fishery operations by Korean boats and occupation of fishery grounds under the 
Agreement.
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V. CONCLUSION
One of the significances of the LOSC was the introduction of EEZs, which 
was up to 200 NM from the baselines. Under the LOSC, natural resources 
under the vast area of the EEZ are under sovereign rights of the coastal State. 
On the other hand, the vastness of EEZs leads to an issue of delimitation. 
The equitable solution is often challenging for States and overlapping EEZs 
remain even today.
Under overlapping maritime zones, law enforcement operation is one of 
the most challenging issues. Law enforcement is essential to realize the rule-
based order and ensure compliance of laws and regulations to avoid overex-
ploitation. Besides, achieving sustainable use of fish resources is not only an 
obligation of coastal States under the LOSC but the interest of the interna-
tional community. Without practical law enforcement function, adverse ef-
fect, such as overexploitation of fish resources, is possible. Nevertheless, law 
enforcement operations in the overlapping zone are challenging due to legal 
and diplomatic problems. Such operations would be a breach of an obligation 
not to hamper or jeopardize the process of reaching the final agreement under 
the LOSC. Besides, it would lead to a political and diplomatic concern, which 
further makes the negotiation process difficult.
In order to address this problem, this study investigates and analyzes the 
series of Japan-China fishery agreements as a possible solution. It was found 
that, first, the 97 Agreement is of practical nature as the delimitation and ter-
ritorial issues are shelved. Second, the Agreement separates maritime zones 
for clarification of governance, the Reciprocal Measures Zone, and other 
zones including the Provisional Measures Zone where the EEZ claims over-
lap. While Japan and China may exercise sovereign rights under the LOSC in 
the Reciprocal Measures Zone, both States retain the traditional legal regime, 
i.e., the exclusive flag state jurisdiction, in the Provisional Measures Zone. 
From the perspective of law enforcement, the Japan-Chine fishery Agreement 
is beneficial since it ensures, by establishing the law enforcement mechanism, 
sustainable use of fish resources while maintaining legal order in fishery ac-
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